

Security Information

12 September 1952

Dear Park:

Thank you for your memorandum of June 3, 1952, which raises the question of the possible expansion of the activities of the Department under its responsibilities in NSCIB 10. General Smith has asked that I reply for him.

This Agency has under review the adequacy of the collection of such intelligence information from overt sources abroad as is of interest to our offices, including scientific intelligence information. The results of that review will be discussed with you to ascertain what can be done to improve such collection and what assistance may be necessary and proper from this Agency.

Our reaction to the considerations put forward in your letter regarding NSCIB 10 are as follows:

1. The Agency regrets that the Department finds it advisable to keep the collection of basic scientific information on the part of the Science Advisor and attaches aloof from intelligence.
2. It is believed that the Office of the Science Advisor and the scientific attaches need not jeopardize their work by an appropriate relationship with intelligence. It is believed that adequate briefing of outgoing scientific attaches on specific intelligence requirements is essential, if NSCIB 10 is to be effectively implemented.
3. Because of the responsibility of CIA in the production of scientific intelligence, it is suggested that the Department might usefully consult the Agency on its suggestions for attaches or its view on proposed attaches even as the Department of Commerce is consulted with respect to our economic attaches.

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr.
Special Assistant, Intelligence
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

State Dept. review completed

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Based on our interchange of correspondence I propose that our representatives meet for discussion of these matters and that a joint report be prepared for your and my consideration.

LOFTUS E. BECKER
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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June 3, 1952

Dear General Smith:

As you know, National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 10 places upon the Department of State primary responsibility for the collection abroad, by overt means, of information in the basic sciences. The Department, under this directive, has additional secondary responsibilities for collection in other scientific and technical fields.

On a limited scale, the Department has, during the past two years, endeavored to meet these responsibilities. The experience gained during this period of time has confirmed the importance of several factors in the collection of scientific information:

a. Except in the case of the USSR and its satellites (including China), the traditional and normal channels of intercommunication between US and foreign scientists are capable of furnishing a large portion of the information required for intelligence purposes. The normal channels comprise interchange of published works and scientific periodicals, reciprocal visits and attendance at international meetings and conferences.

b. In the case of the USSR and satellites, the limited information available through normal channels can be effectively supplemented only by carefully planned covert activities.

c. In the case of non-Soviet areas, the information which is needed to supplement that received through the normal and traditional channels mentioned above principally relates either to a specific field of scientific effort and to research which has not yet reached the publication stage, or to an overall evaluation of scientific potential in one or more broad fields.

d. The types of information mentioned in (c) above can be acquired most efficiently and economically through overt means, provided the following factors are kept in mind:

1. The use

General Walter D. Smith,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Washington 25, D. C.

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1. The use of relatively young or scientifically unknown individuals will, in most cases, not only be ineffective, but may tend to dry up even the normal channels of intercommunication. Profitable contact with foreign scientists can usually be expected only where there is a reasonable quid pro quo, that is, when the US scientist is a qualified leader in a given field, and when the basis of the contact is a legitimate exchange of scientific ideas and experiences. Relatively unknown individuals who only ask questions quickly arouse resentment and reluctance, since it is obvious that their principal purpose is to extract information, giving nothing in return.

2. Every effort must be made to keep the collection of basic scientific information removed from the taint of intelligence. Infraction of this principle may not only hinder the overt operation, but may jeopardize contacts and sources essential to the success of covert operations.

3. The degree to which a US scientist can be successful in collecting information on a specific or general scientific field depends upon his own ability and competence in that field rather than upon any detailed briefing by intelligence.

The Department is keenly aware of the importance of carrying out its responsibilities under NSCIB-10, and desires to expand its current activities in this respect. The following steps should be taken in this direction, some of which can be accomplished within the Department's present resources; others will require additional support.

a. The Department can collect the bulk of basic scientific material available in published form which CIA requires.

b. The existing scientific attaches can undertake to collect specific additional information which CIA may require within their individual fields of competence.

c. With appropriate financial assistance, known and competent specialists can be selected and sent overseas for limited periods of two to three months to cover specific fields

of science

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of science on a strictly overt basis. These consultants would function in the same manner as normal science attaches, and would make their reports to the office of the Science Advisor, Department of State. They would have no direct connection with CIA in any way.

d. The office of the Science Advisor, with additional staffing assistance, could undertake a more extensive program of debriefing scientists and engineers who have visited foreign areas under private sponsorship. The use of this office, which while it has no apparent connection with intelligence, is directly and openly concerned with science, will in many cases be more fruitful than debriefing by the intelligence agencies themselves.

e. With adequate financial assistance the Department can increase the competence and scope of coverage of US representation to international scientific conferences and congresses abroad. It is believed that such meetings are extremely profitable occasions for the interchange of scientific information and ideas, particularly in acquiring prepublication knowledge of work in progress.

In accordance with paragraphs 1,d and 1,f of NSCIB-10, the above views and suggestions are submitted to the Central Intelligence Agency for consideration, both as to their validity, and as a basis for further discussion as to the degree of support to the overt scientific collection activities of the Department which might be appropriate and justifiable.

Sincerely yours,

(sgd) W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

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UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REGARDING
THE COLLECTION OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE

1. The Department accepts the suggestions contained in the following paragraphs of Mr. Becker's letter to Mr. Armstrong, dated 12 September 1952 as a basis for cooperative action on specific cases and problems as they arise:

"3. Because of the responsibility of CIA in the production of scientific intelligence, it is suggested that the Department might usefully consult the Agency on its suggestions for attaches or its view on proposed attaches even as the Department of Commerce is consulted with respect to your economic attaches.

"4. This Agency would prefer, where appropriate, to utilize the existing facilities of the Contact Division under NSCIB 7 for the briefing of outgoing scientists and engineers and debriefing of returning scientists and engineers who have been traveling abroad as private citizens, rather than expanding the Office of the Science Advisor for these purposes. Where it is inappropriate to use this procedure the Agency would appreciate working out an arrangement with the Science Advisor which would achieve the same objective.

"5. In general, International Congresses, which should be attended by U. S. scientists in an unofficial capacity, might be handled by the Department submitting a list of names to the Agency which, after making a selection, would directly finance the travel as necessary. Where for any reason this is impracticable, specific arrangements with the Department could be made.

"6. In some cases it would be desirable for a well-known scientist to be recruited by the State Department for carrying on specific short-term missions of interest to this Agency and financed by this Agency. It is considered very important that thorough briefing be provided. In other cases the Agency has found that scientific missions can be carried out abroad to advantage under its direct sponsorship."

2. With respect to the relationship between intelligence and Science Attaches:

a. The greatest difficulty in recruiting Science Attaches is that of obtaining scientists of sufficiently high caliber and reputation. Whenever it is possible to select men who both have the necessary qualifications and are personally willing to cooperate knowingly and fully with intelligence, the Department will do so.

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b. In the case of Science Attaches who have indicated a willingness to cooperate with intelligence and whose discretion and aptitude for such activities is demonstrated, arrangements can be made for relationships in the field with designated CAS representatives. Science Attaches in such cases will render specialized advice and assistance to CAS within their competence, and will be requested to inform the Department, and, where appropriate, the CAS representative, of opportunities and sources for further scientific intelligence collection activity which may come to their attention.

c. It is agreed that, in basic science or fundamental research, the Science Attaches will, of necessity, be limited generally to access to information of an unclassified nature and will usually be unable, without jeopardy to their status, to inquire as to projects, data, etc. classified by a foreign government for security or commercial reasons.

d. It is agreed that there may be instances in which it would not be appropriate for Science Attaches to inquire as to specific projects, data and developments in laboratories, etc. (including industrial research establishments) which are not clearly engaged in classified research, when such inquiries are not within the specialized competence of the Attache.

3. CIA may address to the Department any requirements which it believes can or should be met by the Foreign Service, including Science Attaches. The Department will make final determination as to which requirements shall be finally levied on the Foreign Service.

4. It is recognized that the present uncoordinated activity of several intelligence and non-intelligence agencies seeking scientific information from foreign countries presents a potential danger both to U. S. policy regarding scientific cooperation and to the flow of scientific information of intelligence value. The Department and CIA will cooperatively seek appropriate measures to correct this situation.

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COORDINATION OF OVERT SCIENTIFIC COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ABROAD

PROBLEM

1. To coordinate overt activities concerned with the collection of scientific information from foreign governments, business and research organizations and scientists.

DISCUSSION

2. A number of U. S. Government agencies, and of separate offices within these agencies, are obtaining scientific and technical information and data from foreign governments, institutions and individuals. These agencies and offices include the following:

Department of State
Naval Attaches
Army Attaches
Air Force Attaches
Office of Naval Research
Research and Development Command, Air Force
Mutual Security Agency
Geological Survey
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
National Research Council
Civil Aeronautics Administration
Coast and Geodetic Survey
Department of Agriculture

The fields of scientific and technical interests of the above agencies frequently overlap, both because of statutory responsibilities, and because of the interrelationships between fields of scientific endeavor. In meeting their needs for foreign scientific data, certain of these agencies utilize both the normal information collection facilities of the Government (i.e., the Foreign Service and the Military, Naval, and Air Force Attaches), also on occasion certain ones undertake or establish special information collecting missions on their own. The results of utilizing these various facilities has been on several occasions an embarrassing duplication of requests to foreign organizations and a multiplicity of uncoordinated requests. This has incurred the waste of time of foreign scientists, which they resent, and made them suspicious that all requests for scientific information arise from intelligence or other ulterior motives. The traditional flow of scientific information into this country is in serious jeopardy because of lack of coordination. The importance to national security of access to sources of foreign scientific information and of collaboration between U. S. and foreign science on both governmental and private levels warrants careful consideration of measures to avoid the potential dangers described above.

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Measures should also be taken to ensure that information which has been collected is made available to those who need it.

3. In the case of the "normal" information collecting activities of the Government regulations (NSCID-2) exist which place responsibility and a measure of authority in the hands of Chiefs of Mission for coordinating the activities of the Foreign Service and the Service Attaches. These regulations envisage that each Chief of Mission be aware of the stated needs and requirements of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and that he ensure that representatives of these agencies correlate their activities to ensure the maximum collection of needed information in the most efficient and economical manner possible.

4. Experience has shown that NSCID-2 has not been completely or effectively implemented for the following reasons:

a. Some Chiefs of Mission have either not been fully cognizant of their responsibilities or lacked time or adequate staff to carry them out.

b. Faced with duplicatory or conflicting requests levied upon Attaches or the Foreign Service, Chiefs of Mission have been reluctant to jeopardize the relationships of a collecting officer with his parent agency by exercising a perhaps nebulous "Coordinating" authority in a manner which would limit or restrict the collecting officer's ability to meet directly and personally his agency's request.

c. Contributory to b. above, Washington agencies have apparently not in all cases communicated to each other on a regular basis their plans and specific requirements for collection activities so that initial steps could be taken here to pool resources and efforts.

5. In the field of science and technology, perhaps more than in any other field, "normal" collection activities are supplemented by special efforts to collect information which are undertaken in many cases by non-intelligence agencies and offices. These non-intelligence offices are usually unaware of NSCID-2, and do not participate in the general interchange of information conducted by the intelligence community. Frequently their activities are not normally communicated in advance to the Chief of Mission, or not communicated at all.

6. The consequences of inadequate implementation of NSCID-2, and of uncoordinated activities of non-intelligence agencies in the scientific field will be felt most seriously with respect to Western European countries. These countries (France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway) possess a potential in scientific knowledge which make them important both as sources of information and as collaborators in scientific research and development.

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Efforts to develop a more systematic and rational approach by the U. S. to sources of scientific and technical information may logically be centered initially on these countries. In view of the above consideration, it is believed that necessary measures can be taken at the present time by a series of specific actions, without the necessity of any additional directives or coordinating machinery.

PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION

7. a. State and CIA will jointly determine which Western European (or other) countries, in addition to those mentioned above, are affected by this problem.

b. (1) State will prepare a draft communication to the Chief of Mission in each country drawing his attention to the problem of coordinating scientific collection activities and his responsibilities under NSCIDs-2, as further elaborated by NSCID-10. Each Chief of Mission will be requested to undertake these responsibilities personally or to designate a member of his staff or to appoint an ad hoc committee from his staff to whom responsibilities as regards science and technology are delegated.

(2) The above draft communication will be discussed with and have the concurrence of CIA and Army, Navy and Air Force, and information copies of the final agreed communication will be sent to the service attaches by their respective agencies, as well as issued to Chiefs of Mission by State.

(3) The identity of the coordinating officer of officers designated by each Chief of Mission will be communicated by State to CIA, Army, Navy and Air Force.

c. Upon completion of the above action, the DCI will address a letter to the State Department, indicating his approval and support of the coordination measures taken by State.

d. State will address a communication to the IAC and non-IAC agencies which have or may in the future have overseas activities in the fields of science and technology. This letter will emphasize the necessity for ensuring proper dissemination to the intelligence agencies of information reaching the United States.

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